Amphithéâtre Marguerite de Navarre, Site Marcelin Berthelot
Open to all
-
  • Brentano: the Aristotelian theory of psychic inhabitation
  • The synergistic model of sensation
  • The felt is in the sensing
  • Sensation is the joint act (synergy) of the sensing and the feeling
  • This is the model Brentano is aiming for when he speaks of inhabitation in Aristotle
  • The word Einwohnung is used only once in Psychology in an Aristotelian context: this is where Brentano analyzes the aporia of De anima, 425b15-16, corresponding to the problem known (today) as "conscious sensation": whether sight perceives itself by perceiving colors, or whether hearing perceives its auditory act at the same time as it perceives sounds
  • The two models of immanence in the 1867 thesis on Aristotle
  • "Subjective immanence", material, physical, of form in matter (the physical subject) and "objective immanence", immaterial, psychic, of form in the soul (the psychic subject)
  • Beyond Aristotle with Aristotle: the Brentanian two-object theory
  • The two Brentanian theories of the two objects: 'T2O' and 'T2O
    • t2O": every psychic act, in addition to its primary object (felt, perceived, thought), contains itself as a secondary object
    • "T2O": awareness of perceiving an object contains awareness of the perceived object
  • Brentano's readings
  • Mark Textor: the Dual Object Thesis: Any presentation directed on f-ing a is also directed upon a (co-presents a)
  • Chrudzimski: the "Mediator Theory
  • The shock of simplification: the five factors of the intentional relationship
  • The two basic principles
    • P1: "every psychic phenomenon contains something in itself as an object"
    • P2: "every psychic act is accompanied by a correlative consciousness"
  • The two fundamental consequences
    • C1: every psychic act contains itself as an object
    • C2: every psychic act has two objects
  • The Brentanian mereological model of the psyche as a structure of self-inclusion
  • Brentano's law: as soon as a psychic act is given as an object of concomitant internal knowledge, in addition to its relation to a primary object, it contains itself in totality as represented and known
  • Analysis of the relationship of self-inclusion and extension to feeling. An "Aristotelian" Brentanian counterproposal to Augustinian mutual immanence, and to the perichoretic model of the soul
  • Self-inclusion is not triple interlocking
  • Fusion(Verschmelzung) versus interlocking
  • Universality of representation(Vorstellung)
  • There is no psychic state without representation