- Comparison between Bain's position and its reconstruction by Brentano
- The Brentanian scenario: modern classifications of mental activity
- The tripartition of mental phenomena: Kant, Tetens, Mendelssohn, Herbart
- Aristotle's three classifications
- Resumption of Brentano's theses
- *T1 definition of the psychic and reclassification of mental activities
- *T2: intentional in-existence as a common characteristic of psychic phenomena, and interconnection of said phenomena
- The new tripartition: "Representation, Judgment, Affective Movements" replaces "Thought, Feeling, Will" - the classification inherited from Kant, later taken up by Arendt
- Intentional in-existence and intentionality
- The canonical statement
- What is intentional in-existence?
- Medieval innovation
- Scholasticism and modern philosophy
- The constituents of the intentional relation
- Intentionality-thesis. In itself and in its own way, every psychic phenomenon contains something intentionally as an object(Objekt)
- Why "intentionally" rather than "objectively"?
- Brentano's answer: to avoid ambiguities arising from the chiasmus (permutation of meaning) of subject (" subiectum ") and object (" obiectum ") between the Middle Ages and Modernity
- Intentional in-existence is "psychic inhabitation
- Sources of " Psychische Einwohnung ": Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas
- scholastic " Inexistentia " and patristic ἐνύπαρξις
- Perichoresis and inhabitation: Brentano's field of theological presence
16:30 - 17:30
Seminar
Psychic functions. Intuition, representation, judgment (3)
Alain de Libera
16:30 - 17:30