Amphithéâtre Marguerite de Navarre, Site Marcelin Berthelot
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  • The three phases of Brentano's philosophy
    • Conceptualism (1862-1874);
    • Ontology of intentionality (1874-1904);
    • Realism (1904-1917)
    • The year 1874: Brentano and empirical psychology; Wilhelm Wundt and experimental (physiological) psychology
  • Brentano criticizes Bain
  • T1 and T2: Alexander Bain's two theses
    • T1
      • (1)mind has no positive definition;
      • (2) mental phenomena can only be "divided" under three "heads": Feeling, Volition, Thought or Cognition;
    • T2
      • (1) these phenomena have no common characteristics;
      • (2) they do not involve each other
  • Ten-point presentation and justification of Bain's theses
  • Success of the Scottish School in France: translations of Reid by Jouffroy, of Hamilton by Peisse, of Bain by Cazelles
  • Against Bain: T1* and T2*, Brentano's two theses in Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt of 1874
    • *T1
      • (1) there is a positive definition of the mind/psychic, which covers all psychic phenomena;
      • (2) the division of mind/psychic phenomena must be rethought on the basis of this definition.
    • *T2
      • (1) there is a common trait embracing all psychic phenomena: intentional non-existence ;
      • (2) psychic phenomena involve each other in different ways.

Speaker(s)

See also

Lecture related to the seminar: The invention of the modern subject (continued) : will and action
Alain de Libera, chair History of medieval philosophy
Psychic functions. Intuition, representation, judgment

Events

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