Psychic functions. Intuition, representation, judgment (2)

The three phases of Brentano's philosophy
- Conceptualism (1862-1874);
- Ontology of intentionality (1874-1904);
- Realism (1904-1917)
- The year 1874: Brentano and empirical psychology; Wilhelm Wundt and experimental (physiological) psychology
Brentano criticizes Bain
T1 and T2: Alexander Bain's two theses
- T1
  - (1)mind has no positive definition;
  - (2) mental phenomena can only be "divided" under three "heads": Feeling, Volition, Thought or Cognition;
- T2
  - (1) these phenomena have no common characteristics;
  - (2) they do not involve each other
Ten-point presentation and justification of Bain's theses
Success of the Scottish School in France: translations of Reid by Jouffroy, of Hamilton by Peisse, of Bain by Cazelles
Against Bain: T1* and T2*, Brentano's two theses in Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt of 1874
- *T1
  - (1) there is a positive definition of the mind/psychic, which covers all psychic phenomena;
  - (2) the division of mind/psychic phenomena must be rethought on the basis of this definition.
- *T2
  - (1) there is a common trait embracing all psychic phenomena: intentional non-existence ;
  - (2) psychic phenomena involve each other in different ways.

Speaker(s)