Psychic functions. Intuition, representation, judgment (8)

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Analysis of "Note B
Two sections
- § 1. The distinction of Presentative, Intuitive, or Immediate, and of Representative or Mediate cognition; with the various significations of the term Object, its conjugates and correlatives.
- § 2 Errors of Reid and other Philosophers, in reference to the preceding distinction
§ 1 is the most remarkable ^{nineteenth-century} conceptual and lexicographical clarification of the theoretical language of subjectivity and objectivity
§ 2 articulates the distinction between presentative and representative knowledge, distinguishes the "different meanings of the word 'object'" and, in so doing, explicitly constructs the theoretical schema of "T2O" for the first time
Hamiltonian development of the distinction
Definitions of immediate and mediated knowledge
Archaeological connection with the medieval distinction between intuitive and abstract knowledge
Hamilton's definition of the strict meaning of " representation " versus " presentation
Description of Hamiltonianepisteme, in relation to Brentano's psychology
First element: the formulation of DOT / 'T2O' as part of the Hamiltonian rejection of standard theory, accepted by Reid and Stewart (and rejected by Brentano), making consciousness a separate faculty
The universality of consciousness implies its non-separation
Hamilton formulates and generalizes the KK-thesis
Tertullian: an unexpected source for Hamilton
Second element: the classification of psychic functions
The dispute between Brentano and Hamilton concerns the status of feelings
It leads to a distinction between subject and object, in which the ultimate figure of the subject-object chiasmus is realized
Hamilton confines feelings to the "subjectively subjective": he does not extend to feelings the characterization of the psychic as "intentionally containing within itself an object[Gegenstand]"
Analysis of Hamilton's texts on the distinction between subectivo-subjective, objectivo-objective and subjectivo-objective
Brentano's emergence of the Arendtian notion of "two-in-one
Third element: the Hamiltonian invention of representationism
According to Hamilton, the history of the philosophy of mind oscillates between two opposing models: the presentationist thesis, according to which, in perception, the immediate object of representation is something different from the mind, in other words, the thing itself(res ipsa), and representationism, according to which there is an intermediate object between the mind and the world, which is a modification of the mind itself
Aftermath of the Hamiltonian distinction in the Scottish School: James Frederick Ferrier (1808-1864)
Representationalism and "T2O
Current historiography and philosophy fail to recognize the Hamiltonianepisteme
Its consequences
Provisional conclusions: three aspects overlooked in the history of psychology, from the Middle Ages to early modernity