- Analysis of "Note B
- Two sections
- § 1. The distinction of Presentative, Intuitive, or Immediate, and of Representative or Mediate cognition; with the various significations of the term Object, its conjugates and correlatives.
- § 2 Errors of Reid and other Philosophers, in reference to the preceding distinction
- § 1 is the most remarkable nineteenth-century conceptual and lexicographical clarification of the theoretical language of subjectivity and objectivity
- § 2 articulates the distinction between presentative and representative knowledge, distinguishes the "different meanings of the word 'object'" and, in so doing, explicitly constructs the theoretical schema of "T2O" for the first time
- Hamiltonian development of the distinction
- Definitions of immediate and mediated knowledge
- Archaeological connection with the medieval distinction between intuitive and abstract knowledge
- Hamilton's definition of the strict meaning of " representation " versus " presentation
- Description of Hamiltonianepisteme, in relation to Brentano's psychology
- First element: the formulation of DOT / 'T2O' as part of the Hamiltonian rejection of standard theory, accepted by Reid and Stewart (and rejected by Brentano), making consciousness a separate faculty
- The universality of consciousness implies its non-separation
- Hamilton formulates and generalizes the KK-thesis
- Tertullian: an unexpected source for Hamilton
- Second element: the classification of psychic functions
- The dispute between Brentano and Hamilton concerns the status of feelings
- It leads to a distinction between subject and object, in which the ultimate figure of the subject-object chiasmus is realized
- Hamilton confines feelings to the "subjectively subjective": he does not extend to feelings the characterization of the psychic as "intentionally containing within itself an object[Gegenstand]"
- Analysis of Hamilton's texts on the distinction between subectivo-subjective, objectivo-objective and subjectivo-objective
- Brentano's emergence of the Arendtian notion of "two-in-one
- Third element: the Hamiltonian invention of representationism
- According to Hamilton, the history of the philosophy of mind oscillates between two opposing models: the presentationist thesis, according to which, in perception, the immediate object of representation is something different from the mind, in other words, the thing itself(res ipsa), and representationism, according to which there is an intermediate object between the mind and the world, which is a modification of the mind itself
- Aftermath of the Hamiltonian distinction in the Scottish School: James Frederick Ferrier (1808-1864)
- Representationalism and "T2O
- Current historiography and philosophy fail to recognize the Hamiltonianepisteme
- Its consequences
- Provisional conclusions: three aspects overlooked in the history of psychology, from the Middle Ages to early modernity
17:45 - 19:00
Seminar
Psychic functions. Intuition, representation, judgment (8)
Alain de Libera
17:45 - 19:00
