- Collingwood and Foucault: reenactment concerns statements
- Statement and sentence according to Skinner
- Ontology of fictions and theory of reference
- The unicorn and the chimera
- The unicorn: from Marco Polo to Umberto Eco
- Kant's unicorn. The concept of being can never be predicate but only subject in a judgment
- Land unicorn and sea unicorn (narwhal)
- Kantian reformulation of "the sea unicorn exists": "to a certain existing sea animal belong together the predicates, which I mentally attribute to a unicorn."
- In other words, "the representation of the sea unicorn is an experimental concept"
- The Kantian revolution: "when in common usage Dasein occurs as a predicate, it is less a predicate of the thing itself, than of the thought we have of it."
- Comparison of Kant's thesis with Brentan's theory of "double judgment
- Heideggerian interpretation of Brentano
- On the distinction between "existence is not a predicate" and "existence is not a real predicate
- Kant's thesis that existence is a predicate not of the thing, but of the thought we have of it is attested, as early as the 12th century, in connection with "chimera", an example of an impossible thing, and "Homer", an example of a thing that no longer exists
- Analysis of Guillaume de Champeaux's thesis as reported by Abélard
- "Homer is a poet" attributes no being to Homer; it is Homer's work that is attributed the being
- "A chimera is conceivable" does not attribute any property to the chimera
- In this sentence, "conceivable" does not refer to the thinkable, but to the thinking
- Guillaume's theory inaugurates adverbial theories of judgment such as that of Curt John Ducasse (1881-1969)
- Adverbialism and reism: remarks on the "truth-bearer" theory in the last Brentano
- To say: (there is) an "A-thought" is to say: (there is) an "A-thinking"
- Conclusions. Truth-bearer and truth-teller.
11:30 - 13:00
