The fifth session focused on the advantages of the dispositionalist model in terms of its approach to the treatment of laws.
A dispositionalist approach to laws outweighs: a) the humian model or "best systems" theory (Ramsey-Lewis: junction of theses due to J.S. Mill, F. Ramsey and D. Lewis); b) the nomological argument model (Armstrong, or AN: there is a set S of features of the world. There are S because there are laws of nature [Armstrong, 1983, chap. 2-5]); c) the "natural necessity" model (Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong, or DTA: N [F,G]). The mystery surrounding dispositions seems to have changed sides. Indeed, dispositional monism seems more in tune with what science seems to be telling us about the world, and also proposes an interesting alliance between laws and dispositions.
However, the approach has a number of shortcomings:
First group of objections
- The relationship between power and its manifestation can be thought of in several ways: causal, intentional, actualization (Aristotle); the flammability of a match. We are under threat from an incoherent, unreal and contradictory world (S. Blackburn).
- It does not provide a satisfactory answer to the objection often made about the infinite regress of dispositions or powers (a constant reminder of "Agrippa's challenge", cf. S Psillos): why not consider that the base itself may not be dispositional?
- It doesn't provide good criteria for individuating dispositional properties Some properties seem to escape the dispositional.
Second group of objections - the dispositionalist's trilemma: where does the causal power of disposition lie?
- in the property's intrinsic causal capacity?
- in its interactional (and therefore relational) capacity?
- in the fact that, in one way or another, it falls under the jurisdiction of a law of nature? Why it's impossible to dispense with laws.
