Logic and semantics of dispositional attributions

The second session highlighted the need for a prior semantic examination of dispositions, and the main difficulties to be faced: can we make a distinction between categorical and dispositional, even within our attributions of properties? Is the link between dispositions and conditionals direct or indirect? How can we distinguish between dispositions, states and occurrences? With regard to the requirement that our predicates have referential capacity, we can invoke various criteria: reference via the categorical basis, via intentionality, via the dualism of properties of the same object, via the argument of two orders of properties, and finally via the argument of insertion in a law of nature. We have examined the arguments against (D.H. Mellor) and for (E. Prior) the distinction. In a slightly different, more deflationary vein, arguments in favor of distinction began to be presented, but from a functionalist option (C.B. Martin; S. Mumford).