The sixth session proposed, as an extension of the lecture, to defend a dispositional realism that could be based on the following four theses: 1. a causal theory of properties; 2. a conditional dispositionalist conception of laws; 3. a dispositional realism that fears neither a certain quidditism, nor final causality, nor the necessity of certain laws; 4. a realism convinced of the need to take into account the whole categorical furnishing of the world.
We began by rejecting a neutralist approach (such as the functionalist or even the Lockean approach), showing that it merely shifted the order of priorities. The problem remains that of determining a real " fundamentum" of things. After mentioning some of the arguments in favor of relational dispositionalism, which often takes the form of structuralism (ontic or causal), and the need to take into account both rare and abundant properties, we returned to the merits of the approach proposed by Duns Scotus: the richness of the concept of the neutrality of "common Nature", inherited from Avicenna, the importance of the possible real as a working method in metaphysics, which imposes distinctions between orders (logical, physical, metaphysical) but also their simultaneous consideration. Taking the lessons of scotism a step further, it seems possible to defend a form ofaliquidditism, to speak of the need for essences (albeit redefined and "thin") rather than natural species to ensure the intelligibility of things. We also need to revisit the relational character of essence in the light of contemporary contributions to logic. Last but not least, recent research in the philosophy of knowledge and the philosophy of biology suggests the need to explore the concept of teleological causality in addition to that of efficient causality.
