The eighth lesson continued the investigation of properties by presenting the main arguments (detailed in the seminar) that are generally invoked by proponents of dispositional monism, namely the thesis that all properties of nature are essentially dispositional: against quidditism, we have a transmundane (and not primitive) identity condition for properties; we arrive at an analysis of the laws of nature as being produced by dispositional essences; we can even envisage not having recourse to laws; we avoid the shortcomings of the regularist and necessitarian-nomic conceptions of laws; we give a better account of the modal force of laws. The dispositional model is therefore more economical, more in tune with science, and a better approach to laws. Indeed, the dispositionalist approach to laws is more explanatory than the humian or Ramsey-Lewis model, the nomological argument model (AN: there is a set S of characteristics of the world; there is S because there are laws of nature [Armstrong, 1983, chap. 2-5]), the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong or DTA "natural necessity" model: N (F,G).
However, there are several objections to such a model: not all properties seem dispositional (e.g. geometric properties); not all laws seem metaphysically necessary; there is a constant risk of idealism; and it becomes impossible to distinguish between powers and their actual manifestations. So we need to look for another, more satisfactory model for our project.
