The last session of the seminar was devoted to applying the dispositional realism model to properties other than physical ones, in this case to ethical properties, as we had committed ourselves to doing in our concern (which was also G. Ryle's) to account for "abundant" properties and the "ontological furnishing of the world". In particular, we showed how an approach in terms of real dispositions could come to the rescue of both dogmatism and skepticism in ethics. In fact, scientific inquiry and ethical inquiry are both subject to norms, principles and values, as pragmatist philosophers in particular (C.S. Peirce; H. Putnam) have observed.
After reminding us of the need to be wary of any form of "moral rationalism", we stressed that the major problem was as follows: how can we conceive of a rational morality that is compatible with our moral sensibility? Relying in particular on W. James and C.S. Peirce, we have shown how the formation of conduct is achieved through the education of our dispositions, and how, in particular, the link between dispositions and norms is achieved not through a mysterious "moral sense", nor through our emotions or reason alone, but through that disposition which, following W. James, we can call the "feeling of rationality". James, the "feeling of rationality", which helps explain why and how our ethical dispositions are logically and rationally as much as emotionally governed by altruism and the "social principle".
