Résumé
When the "new" B-theory of time emerged in the 1980s, its proponents typically conceded that our ordinary conceptual scheme represents the presentness of events as non-perspectival, while insisting that in reality presentness is purely perspectival. To employ P.F. Strawson’s distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, we could express this version of the B-theory as proposing a discrepancy between the descriptive and the revisionary metaphysics of time. Is this a stable position? Not, perhaps, if B-theorists endorse (as typically they do) McTaggart’s contention that the idea of non-perspectival presentness, together with the associated idea of non-perspectival pastness and futurity, lead to contradiction. For, if this were so, there would be contradiction in our ordinary conceptual scheme. This paper uses an exploration of episodic memory as a way of motivating the view that our ordinary conceptual scheme in fact represents presentness and pastness as perspectival. It goes on to ask whether this case study of time has implications for other instances where there are alleged discrepancies between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics.
