Abstract
According to Carnap's principle of tolerance, everyone is free to adopt the logico-linguistic framework they consider most useful for their purposes, without having to justify their choice with any philosophical argument. The principle presupposes a strict distinction between knowledge or theoretical thought, whose justification presupposes the prior adoption of a logico-linguistic framework, and practical decisions, which do not require any kind of justification.
Several commentators have recently highlighted the difficulties raised by tolerance in this sense. Indeed, by rejecting the idea of a science of values capable of authorizing a rational justification of practical decisions, Carnap seems to deprive himself of any argument against choices whose irrationality is not purely instrumental, and can only recognize in the variety of decisions actually taken a subjective difference of style or temperament.
Tolerance in the Carnapian sense of the term raises several questions, which Jacques Bouveresse has recently discussed: does it admit arbitrariness and irrationality in the realm of praxis? Does it lead, on the other hand, to a form of indifference or to the disappearance, by pure and simple elimination, of certain philosophical questions and controversies?
