Abstract
In his essay "The 'causality' of reasons"(Essays III, pp. 159-188), Jacques Bouveresse not only examines the conceptual distinction between reasons and causes. He also proposes a certain image of the subject as a rational agent engaged in a certain type of relationship towards his mental life, his beliefs as well as his actions.
The aim here is to discuss the idea that "although reason or motive may possibly be a cause, they cannot, in any case, simply be a cause"(Philosophy, Mythology and Pseudo-Science. Wittgenstein, lecteur de Freud, p. 124), i.e. Bouveresse's thesis of the irreducibility of reasons to causes. So what does it mean to "rationalize action"? How are we to understand the kind of reflection that, according to Wittgenstein, the agent demonstrates about his or her reasons for acting or adopting a certain attitude? Is the question of knowledge of reasons the most appropriate way to account for the difference between the agent's relationship to causes and his relationship to (his) reasons?
