Abstract
What is known is necessarily true (if something we think we know turns out to be false at some point, we'll just say we thought we knew it). This can easily create the impression, based on an elementary logical error, that there is knowledge only of what is necessarily true. In the history of philosophy, various attempts have been made to escape the risk of having to admit that the only truth that can be known is the necessary and unchanging truth. In this respect, we can speak of an effort to dissociate and uncouple the two notions of knowledge and necessity. If Foucault is to be believed, Nietzsche has, in a way, taken a further, much more decisive step: whereas Spinoza can be considered the philosopher par excellence, because he is the one who "links truth and knowledge in the most rigorous way", Nietzsche is the least philosopher of all philosophers, because what he engages in is, on the contrary, an operation of "disimplication of knowledge and truth". We'll be asking whether this is what Nietzsche was trying to do, whether such an operation is really possible, and whether philosophers like Foucault have given sufficient thought to the considerable difficulties it raises and the problematic consequences it would entail.
