Abstract
Brentano invokes single-term judgments (" il y a de la neige ", " il pleut "), to refute the Aristotelian view that all judgments have the subject/predicate structure. Single-term judgements affirm (or deny) the reality of something ; they are " thetiques " judgements. But judgements with a subject/predicate structure can themselves be reduced to thetical judgements, affirming or denying the reality of a complex state of affairs. In a second step, Brentano, with his disciple Marty, shows that thetical judgements in this generalized sense do not exhaust the range of possible judgements. There are also " categorical " judgements, which have a double structure : they presuppose the existence of something, which they affirm (or deny). Once again, Brentano and Strawson converge on these points.
