Abstract
The seventh lesson continued the examination of Putnam's theses, clarifying the content and consequences of the causal theory of reference: the necessity, for reference to exist, not of a "same mental state" but of a causal interaction with the world; the reminder that the fixed truth value of whole sentences is not enough to fix the reference of their constituents, and that elements of the language of the mind penetrate "reality" in depth, calling for an "internalist" model against the "cartographic" and externalist model. Every judgment has a dual component, descriptive and evaluative. Judgments of fact are all inseparable from cognitive, even ethical, evaluations. This has two semantic consequences: the rejection of mentalism and holism, and the need for a complete revision of the very notion of meaning (language having less to do with a form of founded knowledge, than with "usages" and "rules", forms of life (Wittgenstein). The objects referred to by natural species (tiger, water, tree) are the main elements in the meaning of these terms. A "linguistic division of labor" then takes place, enabling experts to determine the reference of terms, depending on the field. For example, "lion" is referred to by the zoological community, "elm" by botanists, and "table salt" is referred to as "NaCl" by chemists. Reference is thus determined socially, and not individually by a chain of historical transmissions (Kripke), or by a form of social cooperation. The environment, too, matters. We thus obtain "vectors" (typical descriptions or prototypes) that describe the meaning and conditions of ordinary correct usage of each term within a linguistic community, and enable us to say whether or not there has been a change.
