Abstract
For the fifth session, Pierre Steiner (Université de Compiègne) addressed the question: "Analytic pragmatism and post-analytic pragmatism: perspectives in philosophy of mind". While certain aspects of classical pragmatism may have paved the way for the selective reception of logical empiricism in the United States from 1930 onwards, other aspects were rediscovered and mobilized some forty years later by "neo-pragmatist" authors such as Rorty and Putnam to reinforce, rationalize or expand in original ways the critiques of this same logical empiricism proposed by Quine, Goodman, Sellars and a few others from 1951 onwards. On the basis of debatable presuppositions, since analytic philosophy is defined by a doctrine (logical empiricism), a method (logico-linguistic analysis) and even a practice (stylistics), it has been considered that "neo-pragmatism" could constitute a variety of "post-analytic" or even "anti-analytic" (Margolis) philosophy. Recently (2006), Robert Brandom's systematic philosophical work, which claims to be "analytic pragmatism", has nevertheless reminded us that the relationship between pragmatism (classical and contemporary) and analytic philosophy (but which one?) is still open and open to question. The articulation of these two currents, notably on the basis of an inferentialism in Philosophy of Language and Mind, did not fail to raise difficulties, as we noticed in this session. These past, present and possible relations between pragmatism and analytic philosophy were illuminated from the point of view of the philosophy of mind, and from an externalist perspective.
