The first hour was devoted to adetailed Abstract on SuZ § 7's theses on the phenomenal structure of what the lecture on the Sophist callsAnsprechbarkeit ("advocability"), i.e. the apprehensibility of "something" as "something". The name of the synthetic structure which, making the being-together of x and y visible, opens up in Aristotle the possibility of "covering" x and thereby opens up that of the false (ψεῦδος), is the (λέγειν) τὶ κατὰ τὶνος, the (saying) something about something. The expression "structure" being used by Ernst Tugendhat, in Tí kata tinós. Eine Untersuchung zu Struktur und Ursprung aristotelischer Grundbegriffe (1958), we examined his theses and P. Aubenque's comments in his review. After recalling the two meanings of κατηγορεῖν in Aristotle (accusing x of y; attributing y to x), we moved on to analyze De anima, III, 6, 430b26-31. The text was examined line by line, comparing the French translations by Tricot, Barbotin, Thillet and Bodéüs with the Latin translations by Jacques de Venise (translatio vetus of De anima, on the Greek) and Michel Scot (translatio nova, accompanying the translation of Averroes' Grand Commentaire ). The analysis of textus 26 of Book III of De anima and Averroes' corresponding commentary provided an opportunity to focus on the distinction between "representation" or "conception" (formatio intellectiva, informatio, ar. taṣawwur) and "assent" (fides, ar. taṣdīq), introduced in commentary 21, as "the most notorious (famosior) of the differences that characterize the action of the intellect". An archaeological reconstruction has been proposed, starting with the Logica Avicennae, translated by Avendauth, distinguishing two modes of knowledge: according to the intellect (secundum intellectum), i.e. representation here, and according to "belief" - literally "credulity" (secundum credulitatem), i.e. assent. We followed this duo in Gundissalinus, with the distinction between imaginatio and credulitas, in Ghazālī, in the Maqāṣidal-falāsifa (translated by Avendauth and Gundissalinus as De intentionibus philosophorum), in Albert the Great, with the distinction between formatio per intellectum (conception) and fides (assent). We concluded by examining Buridan's formulation of the distinction between science and opinion, where we find not only the taṣdīq under the Latin termassensus, but also the epistemic notion of "fear of the opposite", clearly inherited from Avicenna ("scientia est assensus firmus et opinio est assensus cum formidine ad oppositum"). We concluded our reading of §7 of SuZ by pointing out that, reading the Perihermeneias, Heidegger interpreted the so-called "Greek" element of Aristotle's thought by bringing another text into play: the De anima. This fact led us to examine what in Heidegger's interpretation of the logos apophantikos, as in the Foucauldian dossier of the "apophantic operation", archeologically belonged to the history of corpora, the central element of what we call with Granel traditionis traditio.
The link between the Perihermeneias and the De anima is made by Aristotle himself. The first chapter of the Perihermeneias introduces a structure articulating spoken words (φωναὶ), states of the soul (παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, passiones animae), and things (πράγματα): Aristotle's "semantic triangle". In the Perihermeneias, Aristotle does not develop his device by questioning the type of relationship existing between words, concepts and things - he refers to De anima. "All this," he says, "has been dealt with in our book of the Soul, because it interests a different discipline": ἄλλης γὰρ πραγματείας(alterius est enim negotii). From the very first chapter of Perihermeneias the distinction between the logical and the psychic - which would carry the structuring opposition for the young Heidegger between logicism and psychologism - appeared programmed. So we returned to the question of the "locus of truth". What is the place of truth, according to Perihermeneias ? The answer is twofold: the soul and the voice. It is given in 16a9-13. It's the same in the soul (ἐν τῇψυχῆ) and in the voice (ἐν τῇφωνῆ): true and false consist in a composition and a division. The "verb" is what brings the "structure" of the legein ti kata tinos full circle. In our analysis of the passage defining what a verb is, we have shown that, at its very tip (16b9-10), it had been the object of overtranslations since Boethius - the latter rendering καὶ ἀεὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σημεῖόν ἐστιν, οἷον τῶν καθ' ὑποκειμένου by: et semper eorum quae de altero dicuntur nota est, ut eorum quae de subiecto vel in subiecto. In short, the Latin and modern translations (French, English, German) introduce into the definition of the verb, which is supposed to open the exposition of the rudiments of semantics necessary to set up the propositional form, the elements of a theory of predication set up in the Categories: the distinction between "being said of a subject"(ut de subiecto dici) and "being in a subject"(ut in subiecto dici), introduced by Aristotle in chapter 2, at 1a20-21, with these words: "This distinction forms the basis of the distinction between univocal predication (synonymic attribution) and accidental predication (paronymic attribution), which was perfected by the medievalists and all those who revised it over the centuries on the basis of Avicenna.
