The first hour of the lecture was devoted to analyzing R1 and R2. We first considered the texts supporting R1 (De anima, III, 3, 427b11-14; II, 6, 418 a 7-25; II, 6, 418a20-25; III, 3, 428b18-22), and explained how, while not "judging", the senses are always right about their own sensibility: hearing always "discovers" sound, sight, color, taste, flavor. We then examined R2, and its source: 430a26. This is the passage from De anima on "the intellection of the indivisible", asserting that in the intelligence of simple objects (τῶνἀδιαιρέτων νόησις) there is no error, truth and error lying only in the composition of notions (σύνθεσίς νοημάτων). We have followed the development of this thesis in the Middle Ages, analyzing the theory of the "triple operation of the intellect": O1: the apprehension of quiddity (quod quid est) or essence (essentia) in itself; O2: the operation of the intellect that composes and divides; O3: "reasoning" (operatio ratiocinandi), where reason "proceeds from the known to the unknown" (de notis ad ignota). These formulas, borrowed from Siger of Brabant and Thomas Aquinas, once again demonstrate Avicenna's influence. The distinction between quid est and esse vel non esse refers, in fact, to the Avicennian distinction of essence and existence; the description of reasoning as proceeding from the known to the unknown to the Logica Avicennae, Avendauth's Latin translation of theIsagoge du Šifā ' (critically edited by F. Hudry in 2018). Albert the Great's elevation of cognitive inference from notis ad ignota to the rank of "method common to all science" testifies to a desire for knowledge peculiar to the Middle Ages, illustrating, in passing, the validity of the narrative scheme of translatio studiorum, with its two translation/transmission channels: Greco-Latin and Arabo-Judeo-Latin. TheIsagoge of Šifā ' extends the readings in the Introductions to Philosophy (Προλεγόμενα τῆς φιλοσοφίας) of the Neoplatonic schools of the5th and6th centuries, as do the texts by Gundissalinus and Alfārābī on the "division" of the sciences, which often accompany it. The "didascalic" texts of the pivotal years of the xiii century when "university philosophy" was being established, which fully exploited the connection between logic and psychology, inherit through these texts what might be called the universe of Ammonius, even before the translation of his Commentary on the Perihermeneias by William of Moerbecke in 1268 and its use by Thomas Aquinas in his Expositio, in the early 1270s. The distinction between the three operations of the intellect was used by the Scholastics to establish theordo of the logical discipline. To the formation of simple concepts correspond the Categories; to judgments, the Perihermeneias; to reasoning, the Analytiques, the Topiques and the Sophistic Refutations.
In the second part of the lesson, we returned to the examination of R2. Heidegger asserts that, for Aristotle, the "pure νοεῖν" can never "cover", that it can "at most be non-accueil, ἀγνοεῖν",not "suffice for pure and simple access". It can, he says, "be lacking"; it cannot "be false".What is this ἀγνοεῖν?It's not said in De anima, 430a26, but in Metaphysics, Θ 10, one of the texts on which J. Bouveresse has, in the case of 1051b 7-10, based his critique of Foucauldi's reduction of being-true to veridicality. We analyzed this text, then returned to Heidegger. The heart of Heidegger's interpretation of the " pure νοεῖν" in §7 of SuZ is the articulation between the "delotic" and the "apophantic", which commands the thesis on the origin of the false. The so-called "truth of judgment" is secondary to the synthetic structure of the apophantic faire-voir. In fact, there are two kinds ofEnt-decken (discovery): one that does not entail, the other that entails the possibility of Ver-decken (covering). The δηλοῦν (uncovering) that cannot cover is the "pure νοεῖν"; theother is the apophantic logos, theaufweisende Sehenlassen, which can be uncovering or occulting. The synthetic structure of apo-phantic discovering authorizes both. The uncovering that makes a thing = x (etwas) see by resorting to something else = y (mit etwas), opens up the possibility of covering x, of placing y in front of x and making x see what it is not. It opens up the possibility of the false. The "truth of judgment" is merely "the opposite case of covering". For lack of time, it has not been possible to supplement the analysis of § 7 of SuZ with texts from the 1924-1925 lecture on the Sophist (GA 19, § 80 : 601), where Heidegger characterizes theetwas als etwas, the "character-of-being" (Als-Charakter) as the "logical category proper" (die eigentlich logische Kategorie), nor by those of the 1925-1926 lecture, where he stresses thatthe structure of the λόγος τινος, the Miteinander, theetwas-als-etwas, is the main achievement of the Sophist (GA 21: 142: Die Rede ist Rede über etwas und von etwas).
