Foucault's thesis that Aristotelianapophansis is what "gives foundation" to philosophical-scientific discourse can be presented largo sensu as Heideggerian. Starting with the Montreal lecture on Nietzsche in April 1971, however, we have followed Foucault's emergence of a "Nietzschean" model of the invention of knowledge and truth, distinguishing, as in the LVS, between origin (Ursprung) and invention (Erfindung). Foucauldian rejection of origin is a rejection of naturalness, a rejection of human nature, and thus of the natural desire to know invoked by Aristotle. According to D. Defert, by contrasting Aristotle's paradigm with a Nietzschean onein the Montreal lecture , Foucault opposes the Heideggerian interpretation of the history of philosophy. 1) He "reinscribes the HeideggerianOpening in the history of metaphysics inaugurated by Plato", in response to Heidegger's two volumes on Nietzsche, which claim to inscribe Nietzsche "in the metaphysical tradition he sought to subvert". 2) He ends his lecture with a violent diatribe against "the ideology of knowledge as an effect of freedom", in which it's hard not to recognize Heidegger's theses on freedom as the essence of truth, in chapter 4 of Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, presenting "the austerity of behavior" (which makes possible the "conformity" between thought and things), as "founded in freedom". After an investigation of Heidegger's notions ofOffenheit (openness, aperity) and Verhalten (comporetement), and a reprise of Vom Wesen der Wahrheit 's theses on the Open as τὰἀληθέα, the unseen, we confirmed, against Defert, our reservations about the LVS Foucault's use of Heidegger's Nietzsche, but subscribed, on the other hand, his interpretation of Foucault's "critical circumvention" of Heidegger, based on the idea of a displacement of the "Heideggerian division of philosophy", based on Hesiod rather than Heraclitus, on the sophists rather than the pre-Socratics, on history rather than philology, and above all on a rejection of the "ideology of knowledge as an effect of freedom". That said, we have insisted on what Foucault and Heidegger have in common: nothing less thanalêthêia and logos apophantikos. This alone is important for thinking about their respective relationships to the Middle Ages. This alone is also important from the point of view of the Foucauldian field of presence. While we can sway on the terms defining Foucault's relationship to Heidegger ("critical circumvention", "confrontation", "counter-narrative"), it is indeed in Heidegger that Foucault can find something to problematize the relationship between alêthêia and lêthê. Similarly, Heidegger's canonical text opens up the possibility of an authentically "apophantic" interpretation of logos apophantikos : § 7, section B, of Sein und Zeit, translated as early as 1964 by R. Boehm and A. de Waelhens.
Heidegger rejects the modern, neo-Kantian (Rickert, Windelband) and post-Brentan interpretation of λόγος as judgment, whether judgment as binding or synthesis (Verbinden), or as position-taking (Stellungnahme): acquiescence (Anerkennen) or refusal (Verwerfen). From his earliest works, he criticized the psychologistic theories of judgment of Wundt, Maier, Brentano, Marty and Lipps. Paragraph 7 of Sein und Zeit offers an analysis of what λόγος means , marked by a concern to return to the true meaning of Aristotle's notion of logos apophantikos. The paragraph is articulated around two main theses: the first is that " logos is a doing-seeing" (Sehenlassen), the second that " logos is not the primary locus of truth". We've examined both, referring here and there to the preparatory analyses of the 1925-1926 winter-semester lecture , Logik, Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, (Logic, the Question of Truth), on the "delotic" function of logos (Rede, discourse): to manifest (δηλοῦν), to make see. According to Heidegger, logos as apophansis has a synthetic structure: it makes us see something (etwas) with something (mit etwas), as something (als etwas) - which is why it can be true or false. The thesis of "correspondence truth", of truth as "agreement", or "conformity" (formulated by Tarski with reference to Γ 7, 1011b 26 and alleged by Bouveresse against Foucault), is not Aristotelian. "The being-true of the λόγος as ἀληθεύειν means to subtract from its withdrawal, in the λέγειν as ἀποφαίνεσθαι, the being of which it is spoken and to make it seen as unwithdrawn,(ἀληθές) to discover it: Ent-decken ". Paragraph 11 of the 1925-26 lecture denounces three traditional errors about truth: T1: the locus of truth is the proposition; T2: truth is the agreement of thought with being; T3: these two statements originate with Aristotle. To establish the erroneous nature of the traditional interpretation, §7 of SuZ poses two questions, which it answers. We have examined them in detail. The first question is Q1: What is true in the Greek sense? Relying on Aristotle, Heidegger answers: R1: What is true in the first place is the senses. But the senses do not "judge". So "true" in the Greek sense (and more originally than λόγος) is αἴσθησις: "the pure and simple, sensible reception of something". The second question is Q2: What in the Greek sense is true in the purest, most original sense? Heidegger's answer, taken from Aristotle, is R2: "in the purest sense is true the noein (νοεῖν), the purely and simply considerative reception of thesimplest determinations of being of being as such". The texts alleged in favor of R1 and R2 are two passages from De anima: De an. 427 b 11 sq. for R1; De an. 430a26 sq. for R2.
