1. We began by recalling the significance of the return of the virtues in morality and epistemology, which took place in reaction to both consequentialism and Kantian deontologism, and resulted in a return to the Aristotelian virtues in ethics and epistemology, with an emphasis on reliable cognitive faculties, intellectual virtues and responsibility. This gave rise to several programs: a weak one, aimed at integrating these elements into a classical framework, and a strong one, aimed at radically changing the model by advocating an "epistemology of virtues", as part of an agent-centered or agent-based approach. We have thus witnessed a restructuring of the field, a broadening of knowledge and truth to include other values such as understanding, or the flourishing of intellectual virtues associated with moral virtues. But does this solve the problems of defining knowledge and its value, and does it also respond to the skeptical challenge?
2. We then set out to analyze what is meant by "epistemic normativity " and, following P. Engel (2007). First of all, epistemic norms and standards can be understood as norms or rules of signification, norms specific to concepts, commitments or normative requisites of rationality, justifications or reasons one might have for believing such and such a proposition, general norms of knowledge and inquiry. Secondly, we need to consider the links between norms and values, their priority, their reduction to one another - and if so, which ones? Thirdly, we need to clarify the meaning of the concepts of norms, rationality and reasons. We talk about reasons to act and reasons to believe: how far can we push the parallel? Fourthly, what do we mean by the norm of rationality? We have seen that it meets two requirements: that of coherence and that of deductive closure:( a) we must not believe p and non-p; (b) we must believe q if we believe that p and that p implies q. We have evoked the problems raised by high-level norms: how do we analyze normative force and freedom (where does the limit of what we can or must violate pass?)? How do we understand the broad and narrow scope (detachment or non-detachment) of norms? What is the relationship between rational requirements and psychological reasoning? Fifthly, normative regulation and normative objectivity: how do norms guide or govern? Can norms be reduced to rules or conventions? Finally, we raised the question of the possible naturalization of epistemic norms: do norms "arise" from natural facts? What is the normativity of the mind? Is there a "hierarchy" of mental states? What links can be established between knowledge and metacognition? How can we solve the problem of integrating epistemic norms into a naturalistic conception of the world?
