1. A pragmatist-inspired model of knowledge as a question-and-answer inquiry process (recently developed by Ch. Hookway) has been presented, with the following schema: 1. X knows Q; 2. X's answer to Q is P; 3. therefore, P.
2. The merits of this approach were highlighted: firstly, a dynamic rather than static conception of knowledge; secondly, an interesting conception of virtues as beliefs-dispositions-habits on a Peircian rather than an Aristotelian model (these are, by definition, indeterminate, not rigid). We can also better see the links between knowledge and mental and epistemic agentivity, with action (in the mode of practical and theoretical deliberation). It also makes it possible to insert knowledge into a semantics of assertion, and to emphasize the role of affective states and "feeling" as part of, rather than contrary to, rationality. Finally, the model allows us to take into account the metacognitive level, thereby strengthening links with ethics, philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology and metacognition.
3. But the approach has at least three limitations. Even if knowledge is inquiry, the "whole" of knowledge cannot be reduced to it. We must also insist on the importance of justification. Inquiry is a responsible investigation involving traits of virtue and affective states, but also requirements to be met by responsible investigators. As for doubt, it arises more from shocks with experience than from affective states, and it is these shocks that force us to revise our beliefs. The method is one of "scientific" inquiry (and not of authority or tenacity), supposed to fix true beliefs, justified by stable, external real things; inquiry is subject to rules and not to conversational maxims, it follows an inferential method (deduction, induction and abduction), according to procedures prescribed by the "economy of research". Hence, inquiry requires more than deliberation and communication (in contrast to a Habermasian ethic). Inquiry is also linked to the constraints that weigh on assertion: assertion implies the idea of a commitment subject to sanctions. The goal is knowledge and truth. The "truth norm" acts almost transparently as the ultimate cognitive norm.
Finally, we have focused on the inadequacy of this model's response to the challenge of skepticism. In this respect, we have illustrated at some length the differences between Peirce's and Wittgenstein's respective conceptions and concluded, here again, that another model is needed to meet these difficulties.
