This year's lecture was devoted to examining the question of the value of knowledge. It provided an introduction to some of the burning questions in contemporary philosophy of knowledge: 1) Why do we generally place more value on knowledge than on belief, however true and justified? 2) Is the relativist justified in challenging the value of knowledge? 3) Does skepticism constitute a real challenge to knowledge? 4) How can we characterize epistemic norms, values and virtues? 5) Do we have dispositions to knowledge, and what are the virtues of knowledge as inquiry? 6) What exactly is the social value of knowledge?
These questions have been answered with sophistication in contemporary philosophy of knowledge, and conceptual tools have been refined. In particular, there has been an axiological shift that has brought the question of the value of knowledge to the fore. Certainly, knowledge is an inescapable feature of human existence, and in this sense we hardly need to analyze it to understand it. But if we are almost all ready to consider that knowledge is more valuable than belief, even if the latter is true and justified, we find it hard to say why. Is it because knowledge is more stable than belief? Because it necessarily aims for the true? The good? In particular, the common good? Or is it because we have achieved knowledge by following a reliable method, or by demonstrating abilities, or even intellectual virtues, that we can be credited with?