The idea of a composite infogenerative relationship (and of a " inclusive " mental file) allows us to mediate another conflict. As mentioned in lecture 5, the Strawsonian model seems incompatible with the Freghean perspective, according to which it is normal for the same object to be represented in several different modes of presentation, these modes of presentation corresponding to different facets of the object. This is why theorists who use mental files as modes of presentation have substituted the Strawsonian norm that two co-referential files must merge with a lesser requirement : the subject who realizes that " two " objects are the same must link the mental files through which he represents the " two " objects in question, i.e. he must mark them as co-referential. This does not imply that they must be made to disappear by merging them;on the contrary, the process of identification seems to imply that the subject represents this object simultaneously under two distinct modes of presentation.
In defense of the Strawsonian norm, we show that the process of recognition or identification is in fact the transition from a state in which two files are involved to a state with a single file (based on a composite infogenerative relation). This transition is nothing other than the process of merging files that, according to Strawson, recognition of the fact that " two " objects are the same. The objection that identification implies the simultaneous deployment of two distinct but related folders is based on a false conception of what it is to recognize something, one that overlooks the dynamics of the recognition process, characterized by two stages : the initial stage where two distinct folders are deployed, and the final (post-recognition) stage where there is only one.
