According to Strawson, when a subject discovers that "two" objects are the same, he must merge the two files he has on this single object. Similarly, a file must be split if it appears to refer to two distinct objects. Opposing this Strawsonian norm is the idea that the same object can legitimately be represented in several different modes of presentation, the plurality of modes of presentation corresponding, in the theory of mental files, to the plurality of relations in which the subject finds himself vis-à-vis the referent. The process ofidentifying "two" objects that the subject realizes to be the same, moreover, seems to imply that the subject represents this object simultaneously under two distinct modes of presentation, which goes against the Strawsonian norm.
Discussion of this conflict between Strawson's norm and a generally Freghean perspective on modes of presentation is postponed until later (lectures 7 and 8). This conflict concerns a particular type of file, namely "indexical" files, which are backed by specific infogenerative relations. But there's another category of folder: "encyclopedic" folders, corresponding to proper nouns, for example. While, in the case of indexical folders, the legitimacy of a plurality of distinct folders relating to the same entity can be maintained, insofar as these folders exploit specific infogenerative relationships and reflect a particular perspective on the entity, this is not the case for encyclopedic folders. They are all based on the same relationship to the referent, i.e. a higher-order relationship that disregards the specific infogenerative relationships that the file exploits. There is therefore no justification for maintaining several encyclopedic folders on the same entity, other than the (mistaken) belief in the existence of several distinct referents.
