Knowledge, truth and democracy : from the epistemic to the pragmatic approach

We show how epistemic approaches to democracy aim, unsuccessfully, to give a little more substance to the concept of democracy, either by insisting on the necessary epistemic quality of procedure (Estlund, Anderson), or by reintroducing the very concept of truth (Cohen). We show how a model, fundamentally inspired by Peirce, which reduces truth neither to qualified acceptability (Estlund) nor to guaranteed assertability (Dewey), and which presents knowledge as an inquiry in which beliefs and doubts are at play, but also reasons, arguments and confrontation with the experience of real facts, makes it possible to construct a concept of democracy as a "space of reasons". But we also emphasize, in conclusion, taking our cue from Julien Benda, that democracy presupposes a state of peace. To respond to the threats of a state of war and protect the democratic ideal, which (like truth, justice and reason) must be posited as an absolute value, it is often necessary to add passion, or even a democratic "mystique", to "reasons" alone.