Following on from the reflection undertaken in 2010-2011 and 2014-2015 aimed at elaborating a satisfactory definition of knowledge [1], the 2015-2016 lecture, seminar and two colloquia focused on the nature of epistemic virtues. An approach other than that often adopted today by proponents of an "epistemology of virtues" was proposed: whether theoretical (propositional) or practical (of the order of a "savoir faire"), knowledge should be understood less in terms of the classical Platonic schema, as a series of true and justified beliefs, than as a process, an inquiry where, following a more "pragmaticist" inspiration, the agent, as much as the content of what he believes, matters. Now, if the agent is to succeed, reliably and responsibly, in fixing his beliefs-dispositions, albeit provisionally (for they are always fallible in law) and conferring on them the title of "knowledge", he will have to manifest certain "excellences" or virtues. Within the general framework of this project to define knowledge, the first symposium on "Knowledge and its reasons [2] ", already published [3], was the founding act of the young Groupe de recherche en épistémologie (GRÉ [4]).
The second international colloquium, devoted to quasi-emotions in fiction [5], and the first session of the seminar focused more on the epistemic nature of emotions and their importance in knowledge. In general terms, we clarified the contours of these virtues inherent in any knowledge enterprise, showing how they are authentically epistemic and can therefore be reduced neither to purely intellectual virtues (emotions and feelings also play a role), nor to moral virtues (contrary to what some representatives - notably the responsabilists - of the epistemology of virtues maintain), nor even more to simple social virtues.