Lecture 6 (April 6) presented a number of avenues for further research. It was recalled that the return to favor of the virtues in epistemology has not been due solely to the "epistemology of virtues", but has been associated either 1) with the suspicion of the more deontological approaches to knowledge, in terms of duties and obligations, and within the framework of an ethics of belief; 2) to the conviction that epistemology must not be confined to the sphere of justification and knowledge, but must open up to epistemic evaluation in general (and thus to the deliberations carried out in our epistemic investigations, the more natural mode in which knowledge manifests itself, as well as to the mechanisms deployed therein: doubts, epistemic emotions, feelings of rationality, etc.3) to the increasingly accepted idea that epistemic virtues can be studied for their own sake, that we can draw up lists of them and show which epistemic vices they oppose. But we've noted that this kind of analysis also often slides from epistemology to ethics, and we end up wondering what is properly "epistemic" about the virtues or vices in question. That there are "biases" or "injustices [1] " is true, but what is intrinsically "epistemic" about them is less clear.
14:30 - 16:00
