Abstract
Are the entities that we encounter in virtual environments real? As a virtual realist, Chalmers argues that they are. In contrast, virtual fictionalists say they aren't. Instead, such entities are merely posits within games of make-believe, games that are guided by the existing digital props we engage with. The aim of this talk is to explore and extend this fictionalist approach to virtual ontology.
Specifically, the first half of the talk sketches the available options when it comes to the debate about virtual ontology. This then leads to an articulation of a Waltonian fictionalist account, which I (extending joint Wildman/McDonnell work) argue is superior to Chalmers' virtual realism. However, this leads to an issue facing fictionalism: once one adopts it for virtual objects, it is hard to see where the fictiionalism stops. In other words, what should fictionalists say about non-virtual entities like universities, paper money, and Cryptocurrency? It seems wild to think that these are fictions too, since they are so important/value to us in our everyday lives. To address this challenge, I introduce the notions of consensus and mandated fictions. After defining these in Waltonian terms, I use them to articulate a (nearly) global fictionalist story which alleviates the worry. The result is an ambitious, distinctively unifying extension of fictionalism about the virtual to include the social, institutional, and constructed.
