Abstract
In my talk, I wish to explore the thesis of virtual realism and establish the limits of successful virtualization. The thesis of virtual realism states that virtual environments and objects are real (as opposed to fictional) and that some virtual objects can be treated as instantiations of the same category as their non-virtual counterparts. I agree with the first part of the thesis and suggest a variant I call "virtual physicalism". According to virtual physicalism, virtual objects are physical because they are a series of computer states. The second part of the thesis of virtual realism is more contentious as, apart from some well-known non-controversial examples, it is hard to say how far we can go with the virtualization of reality. I investigate this question and suggest some criteria for successful virtualization. According to my view virtual objects function as digital toys and do not require us to engage in pretend play or make-believe. As with non-virtual toys, they share many properties with objects they mimic. If they end up sharing enough properties and causal powers to be used instead of their non-virtual counterparts, they may be elevated to being instantiations of the same type of objects. The biggest obstacle for virtual objects to go through this "upgrade" process is the limitation of the causal powers of the computer states they are made of. For many virtual objects, this leads to isolation - they may be considered functionally equivalent to their non-virtual counterparts but only inside virtual environments. One way to diminish this inherent limitation is to make virtual environments important parts of reality. If they become persistent, widespread, and causally connected with non-virtual reality, the objects within them may become treated as genuine specialized versions of non-virtual objects, not just digital toys modeled on them.
