Abstract
In the debate between Presentists and Eternalists, it's not uncommon to hear the former claim support for the intuitions of Common Sense. The latter might then consider Common Sense to be of little weight in the matter, but Baptiste Le Bihan (2018) has adopted another response, consisting of questioning whether Common Sense itself goes in the direction of presentism. It is therefore important to take a close look at Sens Commun's conception of time. A first step would be to establish that Common Sense has an endurantist conception of ordinary objects. But David Lewis (1986) has put forward a convincing argument against this interpretation. Starting again from Laurie Paul's (2016) analyses of the "enduring self", I shall endeavor to show that Sens Commun's conception of the conscious self can only be interpreted in an endurantist model, and even in an endurantist model granting an objective privilege to the present - that is, that the common experience of the self implies presentism.
