Abstract
In previous work I have suggested two distinct notions of assertoric force. The first concept is cognitive, and divides into two sub-concepts: being assertoric (or having assertoric force) for the speaker and being assertoric for the hearer. The common idea between these two sub-concepts is that of being *prima facie informative*. An utterance is informative for the speaker iff the speaker makes the utterance at least in part because of believing the proposition expressed. An utterance is informative for the hearer iff the hearer believes the proposition expressed at least in part because of observing the utterance.
The second concept is functional: the force of the utterance *applies* the proposition asserted to the relevant index. Typically, the relevant index is the actual world. For a centered-world theorist it is typically the triple of the actual world, the current time, and the speaker. The force thus connects the content to the index. The speaker asserts the proposition *about* the index.
The question arises: What is the connection between these two concepts? More precisely, if the functional concept is adequate, does the cognitive concept implement it? And if so, how? In this talk I shall try to answer these questions.
