Abstract
This talk connects two questions that are seldom brought together: (1) whether propositional embedding requires a force/content distinction; and (2) what kind of compositional model applies to non-atomic propositions. It has three main goals. First, it discusses and criticizes the view that forceful propositions compose non-mereologically on the model of Fregean reference. Some recent accounts of embedding, it argues, can be taken to propose versions of this approach (Hanks 2019, Hom & Schwartz 2020, Schmitz forthcoming). Secondly, it contrasts this unorthodox approach with the dominant view, on which forceless propositions compose like Fregean sense on the part/whole model. Finally, it proposes a third compositional model for propositional embedding, on which simulations of forceful propositions, which are neither forceful nor truth-evaluable, compose on the part/whole model.
