Abstract
Essentialism made a spectacular comeback in metaphysics and the philosophy of science around the 1970s. This revival is mainly due to the seminal work of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam, whose seminal theses articulated the idea that science empirically discovers the essence of natural species. This new "scientific essentialism", now widespread, has been attacked on several levels by philosopher Joseph LaPorte (1996, 1998, 2003, 2010). In particular, LaPorte maintains that the essences of natural species, far from being discovered empirically via the study of microstructure, would carry, in a sense yet to be examined, an element of stipulation. If this is true, the Kripke-Putnam model of essence knowledge would be untenable. This paper will examine LaPorte's analyses in detail, and take stock of the criticisms that can be levelled against him.
