Abstract
Timothy Williamson popularized the project of placing counterfactual reasoning at the center of a non-exceptionalist epistemology of modalities. Here I explore the benefits of an analogous strategy for a non-exceptionalist epistemology of essence. In particular, I consider a counterfactual theory of essence according to which it is essential for Socrates to be human by virtue of the fact that if Socrates had not been human, Socrates would not have been Socrates. This theory encounters two immediate difficulties. Firstly, to avoid making all the necessary properties of Socrates essential, a counterfactual theory of essence must break with the orthodox position (defended elsewhere by Williamson) that all counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are trivially true. Secondly, it must be possible to make room for counterfactual circumstances in which Socrates is not Socrates. We explore different solutions to these two problems and their ability to preserve the epistemological benefits of a counterfactual theory of essence.
