Abstract
Peter Strawson has argued that every object in our everyday experience is one as an individual particular. However, why should anything be one if it is individual and also particular? I argue that being individual and being particular introduce two different ways of being one; the first is descriptive (e.g. 'human'), while the second is indexical ('this'). And yet, every object is one! How is this possible? I argue that Aristotle, too, thought that an object is an individual particular, but he argued that, in addition, the unity of the object requires a metaphysical justification. Aristotle's solution is that the individual is the subject of particularity, which qualifies it as particular. I further suggest the possibility of developing an inverse solution to Aristotle's, according to which the particular is the subject of individuality, which qualifies it as an individual. To this end, I draw on Michael Ayers' non-Aristotelian, anti-descriptivist "indexical metaphysics".
