Violent reforms

Abstract

To understand the famous " Happy Event "(Vak'a-i Hayriye) of June 15 and 16 1826, we need to recall the background to this crisis, in particular the existence in Ottoman politics of various more or less clearly defined groups or factions. Firstly, a " center ", represented by the sultan, the palace and the government - generally called the Sublime Porte - which, nominally at least, rules over the Empire. Surrounding this center are the three main groups of actors that could be compared - with much license - to political parties. The ulema - plural of âlim or scholar - represent faith and law, normally under the thumb of the sultan and the palace, but enjoying a prestige that enables them to ally themselves with other groups, notably the janissaries. Indeed, the fall of a sultan, often provoked by a janissary revolt, is usually endorsed by a fetva (legal opinion) emanating from the şeyhülislam, the first of the Empire's ulema.

A second group consists of the ayan, the notables, notably those who economically control certain provinces of the Empire, in Anatolia and Rumelia. Since its formation, the Ottoman Empire has been torn between the centripetal will of the palace and the centrifugal desires of the " periphery ". In fact, it was impossible for Istanbul to control the provinces effectively; the cohesion of the Empire was constantly negotiated between these two tendencies. In the ^eighteenth century, the pre-eminence of certain provincial notables, able to draw tax and trade revenues from their hold on the territory and to raise real armies, became the rule, leading to a marked weakening of central power. Some, such as Ali Pasha of Tepelen or Janina (1744-1822) or Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt (1769-1849), succeeded in establishing themselves as true sovereigns of their provinces, while maintaining a delicate balance with the Porte.

Last but not least, the janissaries, an elite corps whose creation dates back to the ^14th century, fueled by the devşirme system (raising Christian children in conquered territories), but whose military role was increasingly coupled with political power, particularly in peacetime in the Empire's capital. They are well known for the central role they played in Ottoman politics, particularly in Istanbul itself, making and breaking reigns since at least the ^17th century. The sultans, who had already experienced Janissary revolts since the ^15th century, were eventually tempted to adopt a radical approach to this rebellious force, which was also considered increasingly ineffective in warfare. This was notably the case with Selim III (r. 1789-1807), who, in establishing his " New Order "(Nizam-ı Cedid), based on European-style " regulated " troops, envisaged replacing the janissaries in this way. He lost his throne, and then his life, in a violent reaction that deeply affected his young cousin, the future Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839), who acceded to the throne in 1808 as the last male survivor of the dynasty.

This explains why the young Mahmud got off to such a difficult and cautious start once he had established his power. He had to bend to the demands of the main political players, depending on the circumstances of the moment. In the months following his accession to the throne, he was forced to sign a " alliance pact "(Sened-i ittifak) which recognized the power of the notables(ayan) who had saved him and placed him on the throne. Less than two months later, when a reversal in the situation brought to light the risk of a rebellion by the janissaries and the " conservateur " party, he had to back down and disband the " nouvelle " army he had established in the image of Selim III's. For more than fifteen years, Mahmud II was thus obliged to navigate between these pitfalls, without being able to openly tackle the forces that limited and endangered his power. A precarious military situation only reinforced these hesitations : the Empire was faced with a series of revolts (Serbia, Hedjaz) and conflicts (Russia, Iran) that made it impossible to consolidate central power.

Yet it was in the midst of the Greek revolt (1821-1829) that the Sultan decided to take action and strike a decisive blow against the Janissary corps. Had he been encouraged by the very recent victory at Missolonghi ? Did he feel that their failure during the conflict had sufficiently tarnished the reputation of the janissaries? Or was he moved by an admiration mingled with jealousy provoked by the example of the Western-trained troops that the governor of Egypt, Mehmed Ali Pasha, had sent to his rescue ? Be that as it may, on June 15 and 16 1826, he launched a most violent offensive against the Janissary headquarters and barracks in the heart of the capital, and succeeded in annihilating manu militari this formidable militia that had made many of his predecessors tremble or fall. To mark his importance, he christened this victory L'Heureux Événement (Vak'a-i Hayriye) and embarked on a systematic purge from which his empire was to emerge regenerated.