The second lecture presented the general, logical behaviourist framework of Ryle's critique of the "intellectualist legend", or "myth of Cartesianism [1] ", for which he substitutes a representation of mental states that can determine the value of the terms used to designate them. If savoir faire is a matter of dispositions that can be known through their manifestations, and if the terms we use to designate mental behaviors are applicable to them, then these terms have a meaning: by identifying and evaluating them, we can link them to key concepts in action theory and make ethical assessments. We explained the mechanisms at work in the intellectualist legend, which lead us to make an unwarranted bipartition between, on the one hand, "intelligence", whose "exercises" would be "those internal acts consisting in considering propositions" and, on the other, "practical activities", which would only merit the title of "intelligent" because they would be accompanied by such internal acts. The first, inherited from the Greeks, urges us "to consider intellectual operations as the very center of mental conduct" and thus to privilege, within intellectual capacities, theoretical activity whose goal is the knowledge of true propositions or facts (as in mathematics), because we see in it man's superiority over animals and the source of civilized man's superiority. From then on, it will be necessary to "show that theorizing is a practice among others, and can also be carried out intelligently or foolishly [2] ". The second reason has to do with the "dogma of the ghost in the machine", the tendency to identify the mind with the "place" where secret thoughts are worked out, and to conceive theorizing activity in the form of a private or mute inner monologue. We've shown that this criticism of Ryle is neither new nor unique to him. As early as 1868, it can be found in C.S. Peirce, as well as in Wittgenstein. We have pointed out the many points in common between the three philosophers, both in the diagnosis and in the remedies to be applied, but we have also insisted on the nuances between them, which are extremely rich in readings for the future. Among Ryle's first arguments in his critique of intellectualism, we noted the calamitous regression to infinity it induces. For Ryle, it's a matter of demonstrating that it's "impossible to define savoir faire as propositional knowledge" and that "savoir faire is a concept logically anterior to the concept of propositional knowledge". In chess, for example, it's not enough to know all the rules and tricks of the game in order to apply them. No matter how well-informed you are, you can still behave like a fool. A student can perfectly well understand the premises, the conclusion of an argument, know that the conclusion follows from the premises, without being able to follow or "see" the argument. Accepting rules in theory in no way forces us to apply them in practice. You can consider reasons without being able to reason.
14:30 - 16:00
