Polis and justice, Montesquieu's fault

Following on from the previous lesson, the transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age allows us to observe the mutations in the method of Roman legal science, showing how from a foundation of a science of law conceived as a model of governance, the texts of Roman law became the source of a ius commune, i.e. a system of notions, principles and material rules of law applicable by default in relation to particular rights. Even in regions where public governance and the administration of justice were still strongly marked by the university legal culture of modern times (e.g. Italy and the Holy Roman Empire), the relevance of what was now perceived as public law was eroded. Instead, private law became the focus of legal science. Towards the end of the Ancien Régime, the political ideology of the Enlightenment included the separation of powers on its agenda: as a result, the obvious participation of jurists (as jurists) in public governance in a system where "police and justice" were inseparable was called into question. Eventually, expertise on the "police" side was sought more among representatives of the social sciences, while the "justice" side of political orientations and decisions (notably legislative) became the prerogative of elected representatives, the sole holders of democratic legitimacy. There remains the field of the administration of justice (downstream from public governance decisions), where jurists can still claim to hold almost exclusive expertise.