A two-day colloquium on the notion of majority will be held at the Collège de France on May 13 and 14, 2009. They are organized by Professor Jon Elster and Stéphanie Novak as part of the Rationality and Social Sciences Chair. The aim of the symposium is to study the majority in all its sociological, anthropological, historical, political, philosophical and psychological aspects. It will also consider a wide variety of types of decisions, including committee decisions, assembly votes, elections and referendums. Indeed, contemporary research has focused on the formal issues raised by the aggregation of votes, such as the jury theorem and voting paradox formulated by Condorcet. Although this aspect remains essential, a broader perspective may prove fruitful.
We will distinguish between the principle of majority and its implementation.
When majority is considered as a principle, the question arises of the legitimacy and justification of majority decisions. We will therefore explore the origins and history of this principle, and in particular the relationship between sanior pars and major pars. We will also compare the principle of majority with those of drawing lots, qualified majority and unanimity. We will look at the principle of absolute majority as opposed to simple majority on the one hand, and relative majority on the other. With regard to the latter, we will review the various formal and informal rules used when no candidate receives more than half the votes. We will consider the rules establishing quorum, their justification and their importance. Another issue raised will be that of double majority systems in federations (or the European Union), where sometimes a majority is required at both individual and member state level. Finally, we'll look at the curious fact that the minority is subject to the will of the majority even when the result of the vote is 51 % of the votes against 49 %. Insofar as this fact can be explained by the expectation of a change in power, we will address the problem of permanent minorities and their protection by constitutional constraints.
We will consider the implementation of the majority principle, asking how "technical" voting procedures can affect the content of decisions.
In particular, the following issues will be addressed:
- What are the consequences depending on whether the vote is taken by comparing the strength of the cries of rival camps (as in Sparta), by sitting and standing, by show of hands, by acclamation, by roll call or by the establishment of a majority by the chairman of the assembly or committee?
- Is the vote public or secret?
- Do voters vote simultaneously or successively (Bentham)?
- Is voting necessarily preceded by discussion (Rousseau, Harrington)?
- In the event of a tie, how are ex aequo options resolved (by drawing lots or awarding a double vote to the chairman)?
The speakers will be : Olivier Beaud, Olivier Christin, Jon Elster, Aanund Hylland, Samuel Issacharoff, Hélène Landemore, Gerry Mackie, Stéphanie Novak, Pasquale Pasquino, Adam Przeworski, Dominique Reynié, Pierre Rosanvallon, Melissa Schwartzberg, Philippe Urfalino, Adrian Vermeule.
