Groupe de Recherche en Épistémologie Workshop
Groupe de Recherche en Épistémologie
Scientific Director: Claudine Tiercelin
Organizers: Jacques-Henri Vollet and Jean-Marie Chevalier
Most epistemologists agree that some fundamental notions in epistemology are gradable ( ), while others are categorical or binary. The first category generally includes the notions of confidence,evidential support ( ) and belief, while the second includes the notions of knowledge, disbelief, suspension of judgment, categorical belief, justification and epistemic access to reason. In many cases, what is a matter of degree is represented by a relatively simple scale. For example, the Bayesian uses a probability scale to represent the possible degrees of belief and reinforcement by evidence.
However, the question of whether a given notion is a matter of degree is far less clear-cut than it might seem. Thus, for some philosophers, there are degrees of categorical belief (Williamson 2000, Wedgwood 2012); for others, belief cannot admit of degrees (Moon 2017, Kauss 2020). For still others, states that are a matter of degree such as claims are, like beliefs, reducible to binary states (Harman 1986, Holton 2014), or are irreducible. For the former, one can have access to or be responsive to a reason to some degree (Skorupski 2011, Smithies 2014) when for the latter, one either has a reason or one doesn't (Fantl and McGrath 2009). Furthermore, if we accept that a given notion is a matter of degree, we still need to determine what type and graduated scale we're talking about. Is it a simple scale with a minimum and maximum point? Or is it a more complex scale, with different segments? Is there only one scale to consider?
The aim of this workshop is to shed new light on the question of whether or not certain fundamental epistemic notions are a matter of degree. The following
questions will be addressed:
- Are there degrees of categorical belief?
- Is belief a matter of degree?
- Is it (epistemically) possible to be right to a certain degree? If so, can the normative force of this reason depend on it?
- Can we distinguish between a synchronic and a diachronic scale of certainty?
- Can there be degrees of suspension of judgment?
- Is justification a matter of degree?
- Are there degrees of rationality?
- Does knowledge still make sense when approached in terms of degrees?
- Do binary beliefs simplify reasoning?