Meaning as relationship in Bacon, Olivi, Simon de Faversham and Duns Scotus

Starting with the initial thesis of De signis that the sign belongs to the category of relation, this contribution will address the following three questions: i) how is this thesis - let's call it T - to be understood in the light of Bacon's theory of relation? ii) is T compatible with Bacon's position that, contrary to what the "mass of ignoramuses" want, a word can lose its meaning (this question will also highlight the link between T and another central thesis of De signis, that of the constant re-imposition of words in the very practice of discourse); iii) how does Bacon's position compare with those of immediately subsequent authors such as Olivi, Simon of Faversham and Duns Scotus? It is clear from this point-by-point comparison that Bacon differs in that he places the sign under a double constraint (to be essentially linked not only to an interpreter, but also to a signified), but that the signified, for its part, is not subject to any constraint (it is not required, for an x to be a signified, that it fulfill any condition other than that of being the term of the relation of signification - in other words, there is no such thing as a ratio significati in Bacon). By contrast, such constraints are present in Olivi, Faversham and Duns Scotus, who posit that every signified must be something intelligible (Olivi, Duns Scotus) or that it must be taken "absolutely" (Faversham).