At various times in history, certain principles purporting to belong to (a) natural law have been conceived or presented as absolutely binding, i.e. beyond the capacity of human beings to modify or abolish (but with the possibility of dispensing with them, which would merit a comparison with the practice of observations and experiments in the "natural" sciences). While the old forms of natural law now seem to have been largely abandoned, as the social sciences have taken over, the emergence of human rights paradoxically tends to create or develop a new normativity superior to positive constitutional, legislative or jurisprudential law, the basis of which would imply that these rights would be beyond the reach of any human will aimed at restricting or abolishing them. On the other hand, if we look for a basis in "human nature" (for example, by referring to "human dignity", or to "innate" or "inalienable" rights), we fail to see what sovereign power (not even the politically constituted people in a democracy) could legitimately reduce them. As in the past with divine law and various forms of natural law, the question is then transposed to this one: who decides on the basis and authority of human rights?
The law of nature (Golden Age, first epoch), H. Wierix(ante 1580).
