The writing of life and the essay of death (2)

The chapter "De la physionomie" (III, 12) parallels the reflection on death in the chapter "Que philosopher c'est apprendre à mourir", based on the lesson of the philosophers; the paradigm is the same as in the chapter "De l'exercitation", which combines the philosophical lesson with the account of concrete experiences of death, in which Montaigne was the protagonist. And yet, the title seems to indicate a reflection on the relationship between a person's physical appearance and character, according to the topos of a concordance between being and appearance that underlies physiognomy, a science that sets out to decipher the character and destiny of individuals through their physical appearance. The reflection takes as its starting point the example of Socrates as a paradoxical model of wisdom, through which is introduced the motif hitherto kept secret in the folds of long digressions: courage in the face of death, a theme which, through the analogy already proposed between simple men and wise men, leads to the question of the serenity of simple people in the face of death. Through this argument, whose course is disrupted by the repeated intrusion of "moments in life", the lesson of life replaces that of books.

These "moments in life" are introduced through a meditation on the historical troubles of 1585-1586, when the effects of civil war, famine and a plague epidemic decimated the population of Périgord. Montaigne's observation of the simplicity of the resolute peasants' attitude to death prompted him to reconsider the question of accepting death in a reversal in favor of the simple against the "demi-savants", far removed from nature and the simplicity of life, as much as from the wisdom of the philosophers: "It is certain that to most, the preparation for death has given more torment than has suffering. [...] But I am advised that it is the end, not the goal, of life; it is its end, its extremity, not its object. This dialectical reversal in favor of life is based on an apology for "natural simplicity", based on the example of Socrates having achieved before his judges "the extreme degree of perfection and difficulty" which "art [cannot] reach".

Yet Socrates, a model of natural philosophy, constitutes an aporia that contradicts the whole argument: the philosopher said of his ugliness "that it would justly accuse as much in his soul, if he had not corrected it by institution". An addition, however, expresses Montaigne's reservations, as he sees this as nothing more than an example of Socratic irony: "But in saying this, I hold that he mocked himself according to his custom, and never did such an excellent soul make itself". Based on the exception of Socrates, in whom physical ugliness and moral beauty coexist, Montaigne defends the validity of a moderate, dialectical position that distinguishes physiognomy from character. Against the authority of the Greeks and Christians in arguing for the conformity of the beautiful and the good, he introduces a critical distance, "to within two doits", from physiognomonist theory, "for in a face that will not be too well-composed, there may lodge some air of probity and trust, as on the contrary, I have sometimes seen between two beautiful eyes menasses of a malignant and dangerous nature". This theory of uncertainty is based on a refusal to rely on any principle, any universal rule that would allow us to always trust people's "looks".

In a final "digression", he introduces two episodes from his personal life, which illustrate the benefits he himself has derived from this belief in the concordance between the beautiful and the good, thanks to his favorable physical appearance. These are two accounts of ambushes, which illustrate his thesis by showing how his physiognomy saved him from death: Montaigne's example is thus set against that of Socrates. This aporetic chapter devoted to the relationship between soul and body ends with the same lesson of trust and frankness as the troop review episode recounted in the chapter "Divers evenemens de mesme conseil", without, however, resolving the enigma of human identity, which obeys no rule of conformity between being and appearing.

Perhaps the most important thing is to be found in these accounts of experiences of death, which are a way of resolving the paradox according to which one cannot write about life before death, at least without having come close to it. These accounts show that, on each of these occasions, his death, had it occurred, would have been in conformity with his life: this fidelity of death to life justifies writing about life, in that it shows the coherence of a character, of a destiny. A number of remarks, always late in the day - at the end of Book III and in additions - point in the direction of this closeness of death and life: "I am content with a death recollected in soy, quiete and solitary, all my own, appropriate to my withdrawn and private life" (III, 9). The whole discourse of the Essais is thus authorized by Montaigne's proximity to death.