The first hour, as an introduction to Maximus the Confessor, focused on his redefinition of the Gethsemane problem within a new epistemic framework based a) on the distinction between "natural will" and "gnômic will"; b) on the introduction of the notion of "hypostatic mode". To begin the critique of the teleological role of the distinction between essence and existence in the history of medieval philosophy and theology, we have denounced the neglect of hypostasis and presented the "ousia-hupostasis " pair as indispensable to understanding the significance of the monothelism quarrel for the history of subjecti(vi)ty. As expounded by Sergius I of Constantinople in the Pséphos (633), the Monothelist interpretation of the Gethsemane problem is based on an argument articulating two philosophical theses: 1) to posit two wills in Christ at the moment of agony is to posit a conflict of wills in him; 2) to posit a conflict of wills in Christ is to posit "two wills" in him, "which is impious, because impossible". To save Christ's impeccability, Sergius distinguishes between the "natural movement of the flesh" and the will. Since the natural movement of the flesh is at an infra-ethical level, since it is not voluntary, Monothelianism solves the problem of Gethsemane by doing away with it. Discussion of Sergius's theses led back to the theory of the two wills, the Epistle to the Galatians (the desire of the flesh against the spirit), the Pauline theory of the "two men", the Lockean theory of the "two agents". We then posed the question of the subject of enunciation in the second part of the prayer of agony, and legitimized the question "Who speaks?" as an authentically medieval question, thanks to a reading of texts by Alain de Lille († 1202) on Mt 26:33.
17:00 - 18:00
