The last lecture of the year focused on a general assessment of the first half of the period known as " des Tanzimat ", from the promulgation of the edict of the same name to that, in 1856, of the edict known as " des réformes ". The first part of this evaluation focused on the organization - or rather the reorganization - of the bureaucratic machine put in place with the promulgation of the 1839 edict. This analysis was based on two distinct approaches: the first, based on the notion of networks, and the second, on a study of the succession to the main positions of power, namely the grand vizirat, foreign affairs, the army and the sheikhulislamat. The first study reveals the existence of three major political " constellations " interconnected by formal or informal relationships that determined the balance within the ruling class. Members of the dynasty - the sultan, his mother and sisters - provided prestige and legitimacy to bureaucrats through their support or, in the case of princesses, through marriage. A second group, made up almost exclusively of military personnel, constituted the " old guard ", who represented conservative tendencies but also ensured the transition from the old regime of Mahmud II to that of the Tanzimat through informal links with representatives of the new bureaucratic elite. The latter, the only ones in contact with European diplomacy, formed a third group who, around 1845, would take over the reins of the system, as the chronological section of this part of the analysis shows. Thus, the Sublime Porte and foreign affairs would henceforth be dominated by the " modern " Reşid, Âli and Fuad pashas, while the " ancient ", considerably marginalized, were relegated to the army and the religious corps.
The second part of the analysis focused on the economic and financial dimension of these twenty years, in particular on the question of the loans contracted from 1854 onwards, the expected benefits of which were very quickly cancelled out by excessive and, above all, economically sterile expenditure. In the medium term, the financing of the Crimean War and the splendors of the crown took precedence over useful investments and the measures needed to restore the imperial finances, thus initiating a vicious circle of indebtedness that would eventually bring the empire to the brink of bankruptcy some twenty years later.
