Destructionis destructio. Heidegger, Foucault and medieval thought (5)

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The first hour was devoted to the program of "destruction" according to theEinführung: unobstructing Da-sein "covered by its own history", shaking it ontologically by bringing back to their original meaning the fundamental categories of "consciousness", "person" and "subject". To liberate Dasein is to liberate the past. Destruction" is always twofold: it "opens access to the past" by "opening access to Dasein", and it "opens access to Dasein " by "opening access to the past". The double "destruction" of Descartes and Husserl is the central aim of theEinführung. Heidegger's main target is the Cartesian "concern" for "certainty", interpreted as a "concern for reassurance" (Beruhigung ), the interpretation of verum as certum "developed by Descartes" that "maintains Scholastic ontology as it is". After evoking the "historical critical destruction" of logic carried out in the 1925/26 lectures(Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, Marburg) to 1928(Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik, Freiburg), presented the critique of Problemgeschichte, sketched a comparison between Heideggerian Wiederholung (repetition) and Collingwoodian Re-enactment (re-activation), and finally evoked the first Freiburg lecture (winter 1928/29):einleitung in die Philosophie, worked on by Foucault in the early 1950s, via Jean Wahl, under the title of "unpublished lecture", we began the study of the "Fribourg turn", the passage from deconstruction to the "history of Being". The "return to the origin" gave way to the concepts of "change", "mutation" and "metamorphosis": Wandel, Wandlung and Verwandlung. A retrospective examination of this "shift" is given in the Protocol of the Todtnauberg seminar held in September 1962. The first, modelled on the self-revelation of the Hegelian Absolute in history, "designates the history of donations in which Being shows itself epochally"; the second designates "the history of donations in which Advent (Ereignis) stands back". The metamorphosis of Being in theEreignis refers to the notion of the "Other Beginning", a structuring theme of the second Heidegger's thought, central to the Beiträge zur Philosophie (1936-1938), Heidegger's second "big book", deliberately unpublished at the time. To follow him in teaching, we turned to the 1937/38 lecture: Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik" (1937/38), in which Heidegger formulates the distinction between das Historische (the historiographical) and das Geschichtliche (the historical or historial) and articulates the difference between the "First Beginning", both past and present, the "Greek Beginning", which relates to the truth of being, and the "Other Beginning", to come, where "the spiritual destiny of the West" is supposed to be decided, which relates to the "truth of being", omitted in the "First Beginning". The hour concluded with remarks on the meaning of " Nous"(Wir) in Heidegger's 1930s, followed by a return to the general problematic of the 2017 lecture designed to emphasize that while there is no history of Being in Foucault, there is a history of truth in Heidegger, as confirmed by a statistical lexicographical analysis of the occurrences of the expressions " Geschichte der Wahrheit ", " Geschichte des Seins " and " Geschichte des Seyns " in the Gesamtausgabe.

The second hour was devoted to Le cours fribourgeois du semestre d'été 1934: Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache. We began by situating the lecture: on April 21, 1933, Heidegger was appointed Rector of the University of Freiburg. He resigned on April 27, 1934. The lecture immediately follows this resignation. In his later self-interpretations, Heidegger presents it as a shift from "logic" to "language" / "langue" / "parole"(Sprache). After presenting the themes of the lectures and seminars from the summer semester of 1933 (marked by the Rector's Address, May 27, 1933), to the winter semester of 1934/35, we analyze the 1934 lecture, originally announced under the title " The State and Science ". We focused on two main points: the nature of the questions posed and the lecture's "chicanery" structure, articulating questioning and "inverted reprise". We showed that, starting with the question of logic and logos, the lecture moved via that of "language" (Sprache) to the question of "We" (Wir) : "Who are we ourselves?", setting in motion a destruction of "ourselves", entailing that of the notion of "people". We defined Heidegger's thesis: the question "Who is this people that we ourselves are?" is a "question of decision". We analyzed the staging of the decided "We are here" as a liturgical adherence to the moment, the ontology of the event to come that accompanies it, and the thesis about history that it implies: the future, not the past, makes history. Finally, we showed that the 1934 lecture took up the critique of Descartes begun in theEinführung of 1923/24, on the basis of a comparison between the Cartesian "subject" and the medieval " subiectum ", and detailed the characteristics of the "Cartesian" subject according to Heidegger: the subjective promotion of the "I", fundamentum inconcussum, and the installation of the "tribunal of certainty" which sets up the "I" as the sole subiectum. On this basis, elements of the Heideggerian critique were restored: the subiectum referring to the Aristotelianὑποκείμενον, man's being-there reduced by Descartes to Vorhandenheit (being-there-before), the "I" to a thinking thing, the " res cogitans ". The two fundamental "historical" questions posed in the lecture were highlighted: "What does it mean for man to be a 'subject'?" and "How and by what path did we come to this reversal of the fundamental concepts of philosophy?". We described this path as a "chiasmus" of subject and object, and then presented the subjectivation of the "I" as a change in the essence of truth. The last part of the hour was devoted to the winter 1938/39 lecture on Nietzsche's Second Inactual Consideration. With the Wandel historial replacing "deconstruction", the three theses on the "modern" turning point of/in the history of truth were outlined in these terms:

the Wandel historial sees the transformation of the representative relation into a subject-object relation ;
it is marked by the anagrammatic passage from "truth adequacy" to "truth certitude", from rec-titude (rec-titudo) to cer-titude (cer-titudo), in German: from Richtigkeit to Gewißheit ;
it takes place when the Sich-richten at work in the representational relationship is oriented towards the self.