" The essential thing about intention is the image ". Figurativity put to the test of intentionality

The resurgence of the question of the image(Bild) and figurativeness(Bildhaftigkeit) is linked in a way unprecedented in the remarks of the thirties to the adoption of an intentionalism whose explicit and radical mode leaves one wondering: Wittgenstein does not hesitate to assert that "if one eliminates from language the element of intention(Intention), its entire function collapses". We'd like to question the significance of this element, which, in Wittgenstein's own words, can seem "uncontrollable and metaphysical" in the context of challenging the Tractatean principle of determinacy of meaning. We would like to argue that it is in this way that Wittgenstein first approaches intentionality - understood in the broad sense of thought's (language's) hold on the world - as a problem that the philosopher is charged with solving, and suggest that this is the thread that enables us to understand the appearance of a skeptical motif that has been attributed retrospectively to the Recherches.