Since Aristotle, metaphysics has been understood as the science of " first principles ". While the history of the discipline provides examples of what these might be (principle of non-contradiction, principle of sufficient reason, etc.), it remains to determine more precisely what a metaphysical principle is. Is it a general or fundamental truth about the furnishing or structure of reality ? Or is it intuitive, not inferential, knowledge about the world ? How do metaphysical principles differ from logical, mathematical or theological ones ?
At this event, we have chosen to return to the status of metaphysical truths " principielles ", in order to determine what they consist of and how they can be known. We have also attempted to determine whether there are any " axioms " in metaphysics, or even whether there can be any that are specifically metaphysical. Finally, we questioned the distinction between the epistemological foundation of metaphysics and its ontological foundation, i.e. the principles that condition metaphysical knowledge and the principles that condition reality itself.
Both transversally and through more specific case studies, this colloquium has attempted to determine which are, in the tradition as well as in contemporary philosophy, the serious candidates for the title of " metaphysical principles ".