Abstract
We cite lots of things as reasons for ascribing someone knowledge or for denying that someone knows. Some of these reasons are good ones and some of them bad. Reflection on what counts as good and bad reasons for ascribing/denying someone knowledge gives rise to a simple argument against pragmatic encroachment in the theory of knowledge. Roughly, if a pragmatic encroachment theory of knowledge were true, it would be reasonable to cite pragmatic factors as epistemic reasons for ascribing or denying knowledge. But it is not. So, pragmatic encroachment theories of knowledge are false. In this paper, I explain and defend this argument: The Argument from Reason-Giving.
This negative result gives rise to a puzzle insofar as it appears that patterns of knowledge ascriptions are affected by pragmatic factors such as stakes. So, I conclude by briefly trying to sketch an account of why pragmatic factors may influence our tendency to ascribe knowledge, even though they are not good reasons for such knowledge ascriptions. Roughly, the idea is that knowledge ascriptions serve an important social function in communal practical reasoning.
Thus, reflection on reasons for knowledge ascriptions and the role of knowledge ascriptions in practical reasoning speak against pragmatic encroachment in the theory of knowledge.
